The Research Bureau

10 Questions about Worcester's FY12 Budget

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In an effort to explain the major fiscal challenges that Worcester and every other community in the Commonwealth faces in FY12, and how they have been addressed, The Research Bureau presents answers to the following ten key questions:

1. **How big is the City's budget and what are its spending priorities?**
2. **How has Worcester's budget been affected by the recession?**
3. **How big was Worcester's FY12 deficit and how was it addressed?**
4. **How does Worcester's current workforce compare to prior years?**
5. **How have city services been affected by the recession?**
6. **What structural changes are needed at the state level?**
7. **What's the difference between Wisconsin and Massachusetts?**
8. **A deficit is an imbalance between revenues and expenditures, and therefore could just as easily be addressed by raising taxes. What about raising taxes?**
9. **What structural changes are needed at the local level?**
10. **Are there any ways for Worcester to generate revenues other than raising taxes?**

INTRODUCTION

Municipal budgets are much more than an itemization of revenues and expenditures. They are an indication of priorities as well as challenges a community is encountering. When revenues and expenditures are tracked over time, they provide the data to support changes in priorities which can address the challenges.

This report will explain what is at stake in the FY12 budget proposal submitted by the City Manager and under consideration by the Worcester City Council. Unlike the Federal government, state and local governments must balance their budgets every year, and bring expenditures in line with available revenues. Worcester's City Manager and City Council face two main problems in balancing the City's FY12 budget: unsustainable trends in expenditures on public employee benefits, and a collapse in revenues caused by the recession. These are problems for all state and local governments across the Commonwealth and the nation. Hence, these questions, or some variation on them, are ones which every community should be asking.

1. How big is the City's budget and what are its spending priorities?

Worcester's general-fund, tax levy-supported budget is about $518 million. This includes state aid for education and other municipal operations. The City also raises an additional $62 million in user fees to support water and sewer operations.

There are at least three different ways to characterize Worcester's spending priorities.

(1) Mostly public education and employee benefits - 70% of Worcester's general-fund operating budget is devoted towards public education, health insurance, and pensions. K-12 spending in Worcester is $300 million, including charter schools. Total General Fund spending on health insurance (including health insurance for Worcester Public Schools personnel) is over $70 million. Total General Fund spending on pensions (including debt service on the City's pension obligation bond and Worcester Public Schools pension spending) is $38 million.

(2) Mostly personnel - 85% of Worcester's budget goes for salaries and benefits. In America, city government is tasked with providing a limited range of services, mostly public education, public safety, and public works. Nearly all social welfare and entitlement programs are funded and operated by state and Federal governments. Because cities' spending is so concentrated on salaries and benefits, budget deficits at the local level can normally be addressed only by raising revenues or cutting personnel expenditures, either by scaling back salaries and benefits or layoffs.

(3) Mostly fixed costs - On an annual basis, Worcester has fairly little flexibility over its budget. Public education is a fixed cost in that state law mandates and defines a minimum level of spending on K-12. Worcester, like most other relatively poor communities, does not spend significantly more than the minimum. Pension costs are determined by the benefit structure (state law) and the investment performance of the Worcester Retirement System's pension fund. Most of the annual pension appropriation is devoted to paying off unfunded past promises, not for employee benefits accrued during that fiscal year. Health insurance is also classified as a fixed cost. Although the City technically does have more flexibility over health than retirement benefits, at present all changes in plan design and contribution rates for unionized employees are subject to collective bargaining. Moreover, the City has little influence over the underlying cost of health care, which is the main driver in health-insurance expenditure increases.

Including other spending commitments such as debt service, 80% of the City's budget is fixed. Only the 20% of the budget that Worcester commits to municipal operations (public safety, public works, general government administration) could be considered discretionary. Not coincidentally, spending on municipal operations has borne the brunt of recent budget cuts.

2. How has Worcester's budget been affected by the recession?

Revenues - Worcester's two main revenue sources are state aid (unrestricted general government aid and Chapter 70 education aid) and property taxes. Together, these two sources provide 90% of the City's General Fund revenues. The other 10% comes from local fees and charges and from the state's school building reimbursement program.

The biggest impact that the recession has had on the City's revenues has been in the area of non-school or unrestricted government aid. Worcester is a poor community which ranks low in both property values and measures of per capita income. According to data used by the Department of Revenue (DOR) to calculate local aid in FY11, Worcester's per capita income is $18,336, or 31st lowest in the state. (The state average is $35,852.) Worcester's equalized value per capita (the measure of a community's relative property wealth) is $75,726, or 12th lowest. (The state average is $165,919). Thus, Worcester depends on state aid as a major revenue source to support municipal operations. In FY12, Worcester will receive about 35% ($22 million) less non-school aid than it did before the recession. During the same period, Chapter 70 state aid for education has increased, due in large part to the fact that most of the Federal stimulus funds that Massachusetts received between 2008-11 were specifically earmarked for K-12.

Property tax revenues have not declined during the recession. Like most other communities, Worcester did experience a housing market collapse. Total residential valuation has declined by 19%. But the commercial and industrial property valuation has actually increased by 4%, and the City's tax *rate* has continued to increase, as allowed by Proposition 2 ½, Massachusetts' tax limitation measure. These factors have ensured continued growth in property tax revenues during the recession (**Table 1**).

Table 1: Property Values, Tax Rates, and Revenues FY08-FY11

	2008	2009	2010	2011
Residential	$10.4 billion	$9.8 billion	$8.6 billion	$8.5 billion
Commercial, Industrial and Personal Property	$2.3 billion	$2.3 billion	$2.3 billion	$2.4 billion
Total Valuation	**$12.7 billion**	**$12.1 billion**	**$10.9 billion**	**$10.9 billion**
Residential Tax Rate	$12.54	$13.50	$15.15	$16.06
Commercial, Industrial and Personal Property Tax Rate	$26.20	$28.72	$33.28	$34.65
Total Levy	**$187.4 million**	**$197.5 million**	**$204.6 million**	**$214 million**

Source: Massachusetts Department of Revenue

In FY12, the City will raise $223.7 million in property-tax revenues to support its General Fund operations. The official valuation, and distribution of the burden between residential and commercial/industrial property owners will not be determined until November.

Also, in FY11, at the City Manager's recommendation, the City Council voted to draw down its then-$12 million excess levy capacity by $2 million. Worcester had built this capacity up over a number of years by not taxing to the Proposition 2 ½-mandated limit. Accessing these revenues did not require a voter override but a simple majority vote of the City Council. In FY11, the $2 million was devoted to operational expenditures (to balance the budget), but beginning in FY12, it will be gradually devoted to a new capital program to fix streets and sidewalks. The $10 million in excess levy capacity that remains is still unusually large relative to most other Massachusetts municipalities. According to the DOR, only three communities have a larger levy capacity: Quincy ($17 million), Marlborough ($20 million), and Cambridge ($99 million).

In the area of expenditures, the recession has both reduced revenues and restricted the City's flexibility over what revenues remain. Spending has become more concentrated on fixed costs, chiefly public education, health insurance, and pensions (**Table 2**). As revenues declined and cuts became necessary, these cuts could occur only in the discretionary areas of public works, public safety, and general government administration. Fixed costs have also increased during the recession, resulting in further concentration (**Table 2**).

Table 2: Impact of Recession on Municipal Operational Expenditures in Worcester (millions)

	All Revenues	Fixed Costs	Education	Remaining Balance for Operational Expenditures
FY08	$475.7	$92.7	$265.8	$117.2
FY09	$499.1	$106.1	$279.6	$113.4
FY10	$489.4	$103.8	$272.1	$112.3
FY11	$502.8	$106.9	$285.1	$109.9
FY12	$518.6	$113.0	$300.1	$105.4
Change between FY08 and FY12	9.0%	21.9%	12.9%	-10.1%

Source: City of Worcester

In FY12, Worcester will spend more on fixed costs than on all other municipal operations combined except public education (**Chart 1**).

Chart 1: Spending on Fixed Costs, Education and Municipal Operations, FY08-FY12



Source: City of Worcester

3. How big was Worcester's FY12 deficit and how was it addressed?

The City knew even before FY11 began that it would face a deficit in FY12. Revenues have failed to keep pace with expenditures virtually every year for the past decade, and since the Federal stimulus funds would be depleted in FY12, a deficit was near-certain.

After Governor Patrick filed his budget in January, Worcester's non-school FY12 deficit was estimated at about $14.3 million. As a result of negotiations with health care providers, slight improvement in growth outlook, using emergency reserves to ensure no snow removal carryover, freezing open positions, and eliminating wage increases for FY12, the original deficit was adjusted down to $7 million.

At this stage, the City Manager was left with two choices: negotiate health insurance changes or institute layoffs. $7 million would require over 130 layoffs of municipal personnel to balance Worcester's FY12 budget. In order to prevent that outcome, City officials worked with local providers and insurers to design a cheaper "GIC-like" health insurance plan for City employees beginning in FY12. The Group Insurance Commission (GIC) is the agency through which the state administers health insurance benefits to its employees. It has experienced lower rates of growth than municipalities, largely because it can redesign plan structures outside of the collective bargaining process. Premium cost-sharing between the state and its employees is also set outside of collective bargaining, but through the Legislative process.

The City Manager's health insurance offerings parallel the GIC's plans, but are locally managed. City employees will face higher deductibles and co-pays, but premiums will be lower for both employee and employer. The City has created incentives for employees to pick cheaper plans (2 months premium holiday if they pick the cheapest; 1 month if next cheapest). Net premium savings for an employee could be up to $1,700 annually.

All non-union employees on both the municipal and school sides of government will be enrolled in the new plan in FY12. Unionized employees were offered the option of reduced layoffs within their bargaining unit if they agreed to enroll in the GIC-like program, as well. According to the City Manager, if all non-school unions agree to the new health insurance plans, it would save the City $4.4 million in FY12. An additional $600,000 in savings would be realized if all retirees also enrolled in the GIC-like plans. The final deficit could be reduced further, to below $2 million, depending on how many employees currently enrolled in more expensive plans move to the cheaper options. Whatever deficit remains will be addressed in FY12 using one-time revenues such as reserves or free cash.

Thus far, the City Manager has secured health insurance agreement changes with nearly all major non-school bargaining units (clerks, public works employees, police officials, police officers and firefighters), saving about 90 jobs. As of early June, only one major non-school bargaining unit has not agreed to the health insurance changes, the Worcester Clerks Association, which represents 80 workers.

The Worcester Public Schools' (WPS) budget is separate from the municipal budget. Its size is determined by the state's Chapter 70 funding formula, and allocated by the School Committee and Superintendent. The school department also has a deficit. Although the WPS will receive $13 million more in state education aid in FY12 than it did in FY11, plus an increase of $1.5 million in the City's contribution, because of the loss of Federal stimulus funds, the WPS' net revenue will increase by only $4.4 million. Expenditures will increase $11.1 million, producing a deficit of $6.7 million, equivalent to roughly 134 positions, or 3.6% of the current WPS workforce. The WPS faces the same choice: making health insurance changes or laying off employees. The WPS stood to save even more through health insurance reforms, since all members of its largest bargaining unit (the largest group of all Worcester employees), the teachers, were not paying 25% of premiums and had low co-pays. By contrast, most non-school bargaining units paid 25% in FY11 (the police officials' union was the last major holdout).

In early June, after almost two years of negotiations, the Worcester School Committee and Educational Association of Worcester (EAW) finally settled on a new contract covering FY10-FY13. The agreement was similar to what the municipal unions agreed to with the City Manager. All health insurance changes were agreed to including increasing employee contribution rates to 25%. The teachers will not receive any formal raises until the last year of the contract (2% in FY13), but they will receive de facto raises through increases in their salary schedule. The EAW originally sought an 8.5% raise over three years; what most teachers will be getting is 5% over the four-year life of the contract. Like most cities throughout the nation, Worcester compensates teachers primarily on the basis of longevity and advanced degrees. Under the new contract, teachers with ten or more years of seniority and at least a master's degree (most teachers) will experience a pay increase and the average teacher salary will increase by about $2,000. These salary increases will offset some of the savings from the health insurance changes. The settlement will save the WPS $3 million in FY12, or enough to preserve almost 40 teaching positions. However, more than 20 teaching positions will likely still have to be eliminated in order to balance the WPS' FY12 budget.

4. How does Worcester's current workforce compare to prior years?

According to the 2010 Federal Census, Worcester's population has increased by almost 5% since 2000. Between FY01 and FY12, the City's non-school workforce has *declined* from 1,900 to below 1,400, or over 25%. The most dramatic decline has occurred during the recession; 15% of the non-school workforce has been eliminated since FY08.

The Worcester Public Schools' workforce has also been in decline, driven primarily by a decline in student enrollment over the past decade. Although enrollment is up by about 1,200 students since FY07, it is still below its FY03 level by 1,500 students. Between FY02 and FY11, the WPS workforce declined by about 460 positions (11%). As a result of Federal stimulus funds, the school department was not forced to make any major recession-induced layoffs prior to FY12.

5. How have city services been affected by the recession?

It's hard to give a definitive answer to this question. A few clear examples exist: there is no longer a visible police presence in downtown, library hours have been reduced, and the assessing department has cited staffing shortages as a factor in delays in producing tax valuation information.

Of course, city government's quality is never simply a function of spending. Increased spending does not necessarily lead to better public education, public safety or public works, and decreased spending does not necessarily lead to a lower quality of life or more ineffective city government.

It is sometimes assumed that crime increases during economic downturns, either because recessions make crime more attractive or because laying off police weakens communities' law enforcement capabilities. The *Boston Globe* has recently argued that crime in Lawrence is up because of major reductions in uniformed police personnel in that community.[1] However, in the aggregate, statistics don't support a connection between increased crime and increased unemployment, or any other measure of economic decline. Crime rates often increase during periods of growth and decrease or remain level during periods of economic contraction. In fact, America's crime rate has been in decline for many decades, a trend that has continued unabated throughout the current recession.[2]

According to FBI statistics, all categories of crime in Worcester either declined or stayed the same between 2009 and 2010, with the exception of burglary and aggravated assault.[3] But increased crime as a result of police department cuts remains a concern for the City Council. Despite the deals on health insurance, funding for the Police Department's Summer Impact program was still in jeopardy as of early June. This program involves special patrols during summer months which are traditionally associated with higher crime rates. It is funded entirely through the WPD's overtime budget, which has experienced severe reductions.

Spending cuts could have future, presently unknown consequences. The layoffs and recent operational volatility could lead to a general lack of preparedness for any emergency that may arise.

6. What structural changes are needed at the state level?

The governor and state Legislature should grant municipalities the same health insurance plan design authority that the state already possesses. This would allow municipal managers to change co-pays and deductibles outside of collective bargaining.

Both the House and Senate approved processes through which municipalities can either restructure their offerings to resemble that of the GIC or simply join the GIC. Municipal managers would have 30 days to negotiate changes with a committee made up of representatives of local unions. Should these negotiations fail, the House plan would allow municipal managers to implement their changes, but set aside 20% of the savings from the first year to mitigate increased costs for employees and retirees. The Senate, after the 30-day period has ended, would require an arbitration process overseen by a three-member board, made up of representatives of the municipality and the union and an outside expert proposed by the Secretary of Administration and Finance. This panel would decide whether the health insurance changes proposed by management match GIC offerings and whether they contain a plan to sufficiently minimize the impact on retirees, low-income workers, and those with high out-of-pocket costs. If the board finds that the proposal is insufficient, it is empowered to require municipalities to return 33% of the first year cost savings to employees.

Ultimately, medical-cost inflation is a national challenge. Federal Medicare administrators and private corporations have plan design authority, and their costs are on an unsustainable course as well. The cost of health insurance for Worcester will continue to rise even with plan design authority.

But municipal employee health insurance reform is long overdue. The simplest and best solution would be to remove the double standard between how the state administers health benefits and how municipalities do, by granting complete and undiluted plan design authority to local officials.

7. What's the difference between Wisconsin and Massachusetts?

Public employee unions, the most committed and influential opponents of this reform, claim that exempting plan design from collective bargaining would amount to a radical change in worker rights in Massachusetts. This is false. The state has always possessed plan design authority. State employees have never had the right to bargain over co-pays and deductibles. To grant plan design authority to cities and towns would grant them the same administrative rights that the state currently possesses for its employees. In fact, municipal employees would still possess more bargaining rights than state employees in that their premium contribution rates will still be subject to negotiation. State employees' premium contribution rates are set through the legislative process.

The Massachusetts House's vote to restrict collective bargaining on health insurance for municipalities attracted national media coverage.[4] Some have attempted to draw a parallel with Wisconsin's recent high-profile battle over collective bargaining. These parallels are misleading, as there are important differences between what the Massachusetts legislature is considering and what was attempted in Wisconsin. Governor Scott Walker and the Wisconsin legislature attempted to strip *all* bargaining rights from *all* state employees except public-safety over *all* matters of employment except salaries. This measure (which has still not been enacted, as it was voided on procedural grounds last month by a Wisconsin circuit court judge) is not necessarily radical relative to other American states: Virginia and Texas long ago banned collective bargaining for public employees and it did not exist in any state prior to the 1950s. But it was a radical break from decades of past practice in Wisconsin.

In Massachusetts, under all proposed reforms, municipal employees could lose the right to bargain over elements of health insurance plan design but would retain the right to bargain over everything else: conditions of employment, salaries, and also health insurance premiums. And this would not effect a radical break from past practice because state employees have never had the right to bargain over plan design.

Worcester is a perfect example not only of the disastrous effects that soaring health insurance costs have had on city budgets, but also the enormous savings that can be realized through requiring employees to bear a greater portion of the burden. The City Manager has saved over $100 million since FY06 through various reforms. Without them, Worcester's health insurance-related deficit for FY12 would be over $30 million larger. Municipal employee health insurance reform will simply allow the savings to be greater and easier to realize. According to the Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation, if Worcester had had the same plan design authority as the GIC, it would have saved over $6 million annually over the past decade.

Greater employee cost sharing is also justified on the grounds of fairness. As a recent report by the Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation and Boston Foundation demonstrates, city government employees in Massachusetts generally enjoy richer health benefits than workers in the private sector, state government, and Federal government.[5]

8. A deficit is an imbalance between revenues and expenditures, and therefore could just as easily be addressed by raising taxes. What about raising taxes?

Both the state and the City have raised taxes during the current recession. The state increased the state sales tax from 5 to 6.25% in FY10. In FY11, the Worcester City Council voted to raise an additional $2 million in property taxes, producing an increased bill of about $30 for the average homeowner and $180 for the average commercial/industrial property owner, in addition to the normal 2.5% annual increase.

According to the Tax Foundation's most recent survey of state tax burdens, Massachusetts' overall tax burden on residents is 11th highest in the nation, although fairly close to the national average. (By the Tax Foundation's estimate, state tax burdens for the most part do not vary drastically from one another).[6] Worcester's tax burden is low for residential property owners: the average single-family tax bill in Worcester is $3,307, or 232nd among Massachusetts cities and towns, according to the Department of Revenue. However, Worcester's commercial and industrial property taxes are high. Only four Massachusetts communities (Everett, Springfield, Framingham, and Holyoke) have a higher FY11 commercial and industrial tax rate than Worcester's $34.65 per $1,000.

Although Proposition 2 ½ generally limits municipalities' ability to raise property taxes, Worcester currently has more flexibility than most other communities, due to the excess-levy capacity it has built up. Worcester has not taxed to its 2.5% limit since 1995. The City has maintained an excess levy capacity of over $10 million since FY01.

Both the Governor and the Worcester City Council have officially opposed a state tax increase in FY12. But some members of the legislature have advocated increasing taxes on capital gains and on high earners' income.[7]

There are at least two arguments against raising taxes in Massachusetts at this point. First, high-tax states such as California and New Jersey have not fared well during the recession, due partly to the fact that shifting more of the burden onto higher earners produces volatility in state revenues.[8] Taxes on higher earners can also encourage the departure of high-earning individuals as well as businesses to other states, and can deter start-up of new businesses and the expansion of existing ones within a state's borders.

Second, there are still reforms that can be made, most obviously regarding health insurance. Despite the "funding cliff" faced by the state and City in FY12 from the stimulus running out, if the City Manager is able to institute all his proposed heath insurance reforms, Worcester's non-school deficit will be reduced to $2 million, lower than in most of the preceding fiscal years. Thus the argument that it is necessary to raise taxes to balance the budget rather than enacting reforms is essentially an argument to raise taxes to continue to pay for generous health benefits for public employees.

9. Worcester's outlook: what structural changes should be made at the local level?

Worcester needs to develop and implement a more effective plan for strengthening its reserves. Even by the standards of poor, former industrial communities, Worcester's reserves are very low, a fact regularly cited by the credit rating agencies (**Chart 2**).

Chart 2: FY09 Unreserved Fund Balances (Reserves) of Older Industrial Communities in Massachusetts



Source: Communities' Audited Financial Reports; FY10 information was not available for all communities

Communities with a weak economic base arguably should have above average reserve levels to compensate for their below-average property values and per capita incomes. Strengthening reserves was part of the City Manager's Five-Point Financial Plan, first approved by the City Council in 2006. Under the terms of this plan, the City would appropriate at least half of its free cash each year to add to its reserves. In FY11, $523,000 of free cash was generated, and the City did deposit 50% into its reserves. However, between FY07, when the Five Point Plan was adopted and FY10, Worcester's unreserved General-Fund balance has grown by only $2 million (from 2% of the General Fund to 2.2%). Depending on how successful Worcester is over the next few years in adding to its reserves under the terms of the Five-Point Financial Plan, the City may need to implement a more aggressive policy to strengthen its reserves.

The second city-level change that should be implemented is a plan to address Worcester's long-term retiree health care liability, actuarially valued at over $750 million, or $61,478 per taxpayer over a 30-year period, according to a Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation analysis.[9] Unlike Worcester's pension liability, this is completely unfunded. It will likely have to be addressed through establishing a trust fund into which annual contributions are made and then invested, as with the pension system.

There is a major opportunity cost involved with every year that passes without addressing the long-term retiree health-care liability. Even small contributions can yield considerable sums in investment return over decades. As with pensions, the more of the retiree health care liability that can be paid off through investment return, the less of a burden it will be on future taxpayers.

10. Are there any ways to generate revenues other than raising taxes?

Yes. Public officials sometimes assert that inadequate revenues hinder policy improvements. But in all policy areas, especially public education and public safety, *how* public funds are spent is at least as important as how much is available. Increased revenues may also be seen as the goal or end of effective policies, instead of as the means to achieving them. There are several policy changes that the City Manager and City Council can enact to stabilize local finances and improve Worcester's prospects.

As The Research Bureau has recommended many times in the past, Worcester should divest itself of non-core assets, such as Union Station, Hope Cemetery, Worcester Memorial Auditorium, the DCU Center, and the Worcester Senior Center. Cumulatively, these facilities, which are owned and (except the DCU) operated and maintained by the City, cost taxpayers about $2 million in annual subsidies.

According to Harvard urban economist Edward Glaeser, cities need to focus their attention on developing and maintaining an environment in which businesses can prosper and residents find the quality of life attractive. Worcester could make itself more conducive to new investment by lowering its high commercial/industrial tax rate, discussed above, which puts it at a competitive disadvantage relative to neighboring communities. It must also present an atmosphere friendly to businesses through the ease of its permitting process and helpfulness in addressing business issues.

Raising student achievement in the Worcester Public Schools will make Worcester a more attractive place to live and strengthen its residential property tax base. So, too, will maintenance of public infrastructure and continued success in making Worcester a safe community with a relatively low crime rate.

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[1] "In Lawrence, a blue line stretched thin" *Boston Globe*, May 25, 2011.
[2] James Q. Wilson, "Hard Times, Fewer Crimes," *Wall Street Journal*, May 28, 2011.
[3] Source: FBI Preliminary Annual Uniform Crime Report, January-December 2010.
[4] Abby Goodnough, "Massachusetts House Seeks To Limit Collective Bargaining," *New York Times*, April 29, 2011; Kimberley A. Strassel, "Union Busting Massachusetts Style," *Wall Street Journal*, April 29, 2011.

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[5] "Municipal Health Plans: Gilded Benefits from a Bygone Era," Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation, April 2011.

[6] "State-Local Tax Burdens Fall in 2009 as Tax Revenues Shrink Faster than Income," Tax Foundation, Special Report No. 189, February 2011. It should be noted that this survey was based on data from FY09, before Massachusetts' sales tax increase.

[7] "An Act to Invest in Our Communities" would raise the income tax rate from 5.3 percent to 5.95 percent. It would shift more of the tax burden on higher earners, by raising the personal tax exemption from $4,400 to $7,900.

[8] Robert Frank, "The Price of Taxing the Rich," *Wall Street Journal*, March 26, 2011.

[9] "Retiree Health Care: The Brick that Broke Municipalities' Backs," Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation, February 2011.